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JURISDICTIONAL ST A TEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-

vi

3-102(3 )(j). This matter has been assigned to the Court of Appeals from the Utah
Supreme Court.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 24(b )(I) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee
presents the following issues pertinent to this appeal.
Issue I:

What is the definition of a transferee under the
Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act?

vJ

Standard of Review:

Standard of review is correctness as this is an interpretation of
the meaning of a statute. Bagley v. Bagley, 2015 UT App 33.

Controlling Law:

U.C.A. §25-6-1 et. seq. Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act.

Preservation:

Plaintiff preserved this issue for appeal by arguing, in an
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, that the
Defendants were transferees under the act. (R: 2045).

I.JP

Issue II:

ls a violation of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer
Act a predicate act that will support a claim for

VJ
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civil conspiracy.
Standard of Review:

Standard of review is correctness as this question interprets
the elements of a tort. Nielsen v. Spencer, 2008 UT App 375,
~

Controlling Law:

IO, 196 P.3d 616,620

Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, ill6, 275 P.3d 1024,
1029

Preservation:

Plaintiff preserved this issue for appeal by arguing, in an
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, that a
violation of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is a sufficient
predicate act to support a claim for civil conspiracy. (R:
2316).

CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS, STA TUTES AND RULES
U.C.A. §25-6-1 et. seq. Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act.
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Tom and Terri Keetch. In an attempt to
collect the judgment, plaintiffs obtained a court order requiring the Keetches to appear at
court for a supplemental hearing. The Keetches hired the defendants as their attorneys and
delivered to them $50,000 which was deposited into the attorney trust account. The

2
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4tL;

Keetches and Attorney appeared at the supplemental hearing and the Keetches testified
under oath, in the presence of Attorney, that they had no significant assets, including any
money held in trust. The trust funds were subsequently delivered to third parties to pay
other debts and to allow the Keetches to make a down payment on a home. Some of the
trust funds were paid to the defendants to satisfy legal bills.
~

This case was filed against Attorney defendants and alleged that defendants were
transferees under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and that defendants conspired with
vJ

the Keetches to violate the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act.
The case was dismissed when the trial court judge determined that the Attorneys
were not transferees as defined by the act and that a conspiracy to violate the UFTA is not
a predicate wrongful act to support a claim for civil conspiracy.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
vi

Paul and Janice Timothy filed a lawsuit against Thomas and Teri Keetch in which
they alleged fraud. The case resulted in a judgment in favor of Paul and Janice Timothy.
The Keetches filed an appeal and lost the appeal. (R: 2270 il2). The judgment was entered
on March 6, 2009. (R: 629-648). The decision on the appeal was filed on March 31, 2011.

Timothy v. Keetch, 2011 UT App I 04, 251 P.3d 848.
Four months after entry of the judgment, all of the bank accounts in the names of
Thomas and Teri Keetch were closed. (R: 836). The Keetches did not pay the judgment

3
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and have not paid it to this day. (R: 2273 il27). Teri Keetch has a son named Skyler
Crestani. In February and March 2011 he was a 16 year old High School student. (R:
2272 ~18). On February 12,2011, Skyler Crestani wrote a check for $50,000 made
payable to PADRM. (R: 1114). Although the money was in Skyler's bank account, the
money came from Tom's wages. (R: 1115). Teri Keetch delivered the money to Brennan
Moss on or before February 21, 2011. (R: 1116 - 1117). The reason Teri Keetch held
money in Skyler's bank account was to evade creditors. (R:2272 ~22).
A supplemental proceeding was held on March 11, 2011. (R: 2270 ~2). Thomas
and Teri Keetch appeared. (R: 2270 il3 ). During the March 11, 2011 supplement
proceeding, Thomas and Teri Keetch were represented by Brennan Moss of Pia,
Anderson, Dorius, Reynard and Moss (PADRM). (R: 2270 il3) (R: 678 ~10 - R: 680 i!24)
(R: 2270 il7). During that supplemental proceeding, Thomas and Teri Keetch testified that
they did not have a checking account but that friends, specifically Skyler Crestani, cashed
checks for them. (R: 2270 il4 ). During the hearing, they both testified that they had little
or no assets. They repeated that testimony again on August 26, 2011. (R: 2272 ~22).
The $50,000 was Thomas and Teri Keetches money. (R: 2271 ~9). The check was
delivered to PAD RM and was to be deposited into the PAD RM IOL TA account for
Thomas and Teri Keetch. (R: 2270 i!8). PAD RM deposited the check into their IOLTA
account on March 15, 201 I. (R: 2271

ii 10). On March

16, 2011, Thomas Keetch signed

4
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an addendum to a Real Estate Purchase Contract that stated they would hold in trust with
their attorney, Brennan Moss, no less than $30,000 to help secure the second trust deed on
a home they were attempting to purchase. (R: 2271

iI 11 ). On April 28, 2011, PADRM

transferred $20,000 from PADRM's IOLTA account to Bonneville Superior Title for the
Keetches benefit as a down payment on a home. (R: 2271

ii 12). On July 1, 2011,

$20,560.75 was transferred out of the PADRM IOLTA account. $2,745 was paid to
PADRM, $16,451.75 was paid to Kelly Crestani and $1,364 was paid to Paul and Janice
iiiJ

Timothy. Kelly Crestani is Teri Keetch 's brother. The $1,364 payment to Paul and Janice
Timothy was made in order to comply with a court order made by Judge Brady on May
27, 2011 and signed by Judge Laycock on August 26, 2011. (R: 2271 iJI3).
This case was filed on August 24, 2012 (R: 1). An amended complaint was filed
on January 29, 2013 (R: 139). The amended complaint alleges five causes of action: (1)
Fraudulent Transfer under UCA §25-6-5( 1)(b) (R: 144); (2) Fraudulent Transfer under
UCA §25-6-5(l)(a) (R: 145); (3) Fraudulent Transfer under UCA §25-6-6(1) (R: 146);

~

(4) Civil Conspiracy (R: 147); and (5) Participation in Wrongful Conduct (R: 149).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on May 27, 2014. (R: 1962). The
motion was granted in part on July 14, 2014 (R:2254). Judge Shaughnessy held that
neither Brennan Moss nor PAD RM were transferees under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer
Act and threw out the first three causes of action. (R: 2254 ). Plaintiff preserved this issue

5
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for appeal by arguing, in an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, that the
Defendants were transferees under the act. (R: 2045).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2014. (R: 2284).
Judge Shaughnessy granted the motion and threw out the remaining causes of action on
December 24, 2014. (R: 2399). Judge Shaughnessy held that a violation of the Utah
Fraudulent Transfer Act could not fonn the basis of a predicate act to support a claim for
civil conspiracy. (R: 2285). Plaintiff preserved this issue for appeal by arguing, in an
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, that a violation of the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act is a sufficient predicate act to supp01i a claim for civil conspiracy. (R:
2316).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The UFTA does not define the term "transferee," however, that term is defined at
other places in the Utah Code and is also defined by other states. The definition used
elsewhere in the code is a person or entity who receives a transfer. Texas has also used
that definition. New Jersey has defined a transferee as a person or entity within the orbit
of a transfer.
Federal bankruptcy law also contains a federal law that uses the term transferee
without defining it. Federal bankruptcy courts have defined transferee as a person or
entity who takes dominion and control over an asset to the extent that the person or entity

6
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is free to invest the asset in lottery tickets or uranium stocks, if the person or entity so
vJ

chose.
The federal bankruptcy definition of transferee is not consistent with the term
transfer as used in the UFT A. Specifically, as applied by Judge Shaughnessy, this
definition would permit persons to transfer funds into trusts and thereby protect the funds
from creditors.
This court should adopt a definition of the term "transferee" that is consistent with
the language of the UFT A, other Utah Statutes and other state law. Specifically, this court
should hold that transferee means a person or entity who receives property via a transfer.
Under that definition of the term transferee, PAD RM is a transferee. Therefore, the
judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
The trial court should also be overturned on the issue of what forms a predicate act
for a claim of civil conspiracy. Most Utah cases that states one of the elements of a civil
conspiracy is a "wrongful, overt act." A few Utah cases use the word "tort"
interchangeably. This distinction is not important because violation of the UFT A is a tort.
Even if it is not, this court should hold that violation of the UFT A is a "wrongful, overt
act" and can therefore support a claim for civil conspiracy. Accordingly, this court should
overrule the trial court on this issue and remand the case for further proceedings.

7
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ARGUMENT

I.

A LAW FIRM THAT RECEIVES MONEY INTO ITS IOL TA ACCOUNT
IS A TRANSFEREE AS DEFINED BY THE UTAH FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT.

A.

The Language of the UFT A and Other Statutes Suggests That a
Transferee Is a Person Who Receives Money via a Transfer.

The Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-69(2)(a) & (b) (the "UFTA") states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a
transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under
Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor may recover judgment
for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the
creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be
entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person
for whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good
faith transferee who took for value or from any
subsequent transferee.
The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act does not define the tenn transferee. It does
define a transfer as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and
includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance."

8
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UCA §25-6-2( 12).
vJ)

This court should adopt a definition of the word "transferee" as used in the UFT A
as any person who receives an asset by transfer.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines a "transferee" as "one to whom a property interest
is conveyed."
A transferee is defined in other Utah statutes. UCA §48-1d-102 defines a
transferee. This section applies to partnership law. It reads: '"Transferee' means a person
to which all or part of a transferable interest has been transferred, whether or not the
transferor is a partner." The LLC statute contains a similar definition. It reads:
"'Transferee' means a person to which all or part of a transferable interest has been
transferred, whether or not the transferor is a member. The term includes a person that
owns a transferable interest under Subsection 48-3a-603( 1)©." Utah Code Ann. §48-3a102. The limited partnership statute has an identical definition: "'Transferee' means a

vJ

person to which all or part of a transferable interest has been transferred, whether or not
the transferor is a partner. The term includes a person that owns a transferable interest
under Subsection 48-2e-602( 1)( c) or 48-2e-605( I)( d)." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2e- l 02.
The trial court erroneously determined that a transferee is defined by bankruptcy
law rather than by Utah Statute. The trial court held that a transferee must "exercise

9
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~

dominion and control" over the asset. In this case, the trial court held that the law firm
could not "exercise dominion or control" over the money because it was prevented by the
rules of professional responsibility from using those funds at its discretion. The ninth
circuit called this the dominion test. In Re Cohen, 300 F .3d 1097, 1102 (9 th Cir. 2002)
C'In practical terms, the "dominion test" requires that a transferee be 'free to invest the
whole [amount] in lottery tickets or uranium stocks.' [citation omitted]. Dominion is
therefore akin to legal control (e.g., the right to invest the funds as one chooses), not mere
possession.")
This bankruptcy doctrine contradicts the wording of the UFT A. The UFT A defines
an asset as property. UCA §25-6-2(2). Property is defined as "anything that is subject to
ownership." UCA §25-6-2( 10). A transfer is "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an
interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien
or other encumbrance." UCA §25-6-2(12). This bankruptcy doctrine would take all
transfers out of the act where the person receiving the transfer receives only "an interest
in an asset," "creation of a lien," or "other encumbrance. The reason for this is that by
definition, when only an interest in an asset is transferred, the person receiving that asset
does not have full dominion or control over the asset. The person receiving the asset has

10
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something less. Under bankruptcy law, that person is not a transferee and is not liable
..;;;

under the act. Because federal bankruptcy case law defining the word "transferee" as used
in the bankruptcy statute would gut the UFTA, it should be rejected. Instead, this court
should choose a definition consistent with the UFT A and as used elsewhere in the Utah
Code. This court should define a transferee as a person who receives a transfer.
"It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our

primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. The best evidence
of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself. Thus, when interpreting
IJ)

a statute, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each term
advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning." Marion Energy, Inc.

v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, il 14,267 P.3d 863, 866. Because the word
"transferee" is generally understood to be a person who receives an asset by transfer, this
court should adopt that definition. If this court were to adopt the definition used in
bankruptcy courts, this court would be inferring substantive terms into the text of the
statute that are not already there. This would be improper. I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110,
vJ

6 I P.3d I 038.
The issue before this court is not simply related to law firm IOL TA accounts. The
courts may face a similar issue any time money is transferred to a trust and the trustee is

11
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under restriction. For example, a debtor may choose to create an irrevocable trust and
draft the trust documents to prohibit the trustee from disposing of the trust res except to
transfer it back to the trustor. The debtor may further draft the trust documents to restrict
the trustee from transferring the trust assets to the debtor if the debtor is insolvent. If the
bankruptcy court's definition of transferee is correct, this type of trust will absolutely
prevent creditors from using the UFT A to seize trust assets. This is so because the trustee
has not exercised dominion or control over the property of the debtor because the trustee
does not legally have discretion to invest the property in lottery tickets or uranium stocks.
Utah courts have previously held that transfer of funds into a trust is voidable
under the UFTA. The "underlying purpose of [Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act] is to
prevent debtors from using trusts as a device to place their property beyond the reach of
their creditors' just claims, while simultaneously retaining and enjoying virtually all the
advantages of ownership. Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456-57
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); See also Leach v. Anderson, 535 P .2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1975). In
Leach v. Anderson, a debtor created a trust, transferred assets into it and used it to evade

collection. The court found the trust void. Id. More recently, the Utah Supreme court
came to the same conclusion when a debtor "retained full and complete enjoyment and
benefit of the trust for the remainder of her life." McGoldrick v. Walker, 838 P.2d 1139,

12
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1140 (Utah 1992); see also Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78, 132 P.3d 63.
vP

The legislature did wish to carve out the ability of persons to transfer funds to an
irrevocable trust free of the tentacles of the UFT A. The legislature passed UCA §25-6-14
for that purpose. Subsection ( 5) lists numerous factors that must be satisfied to make such
trust assets free of the UFT A, including subsection (I) which makes the trust ineffective if
the debtor was insolvent immediately following the transfer to trust.
If the dominion test is applied to "transferees," UCA §25-6-14 serves no purpose.

It doesn't matter whether the debtor was insolvent after the transfer to the trust or whether
any other factors in subsection 5 are met. So long as the trustee does not have the legal
right to invest the trust assets in lottery tickets or uranium stock, the funds are protected
from the UFTA.
VD

B.

Case Law From Other States Supports the Conclusion That the
Conveyance of Money into Trust Is a Tran sfer

"no effort of a debtor to hinder or delay his creditors is more severely
condemned than an attempt to place his property where he can enjoy it and
at the same time [adversely effect the rights of his creditors]." 37 AmJur 2d
Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, §33
The overriding majority of case law confirms this conclusion: A
conveyance of property in trust for the benefit of the grantor has frequently
been held to be invalid, such as where a decedent conveyed property for his
own benefit. ... [I]t is a general rule that an individual cannot create out of
his own property, for his own benefit, a trust for himself and thereby defeat
13
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the lawful claims of his creditors. ; See 3 7 AmJur 2d Fraudulent
Conveyances and Transfers, §34
A secret reservation or trust in favor of the granter in a conveyance of
property is a badge of fraud and usually is viewed as being per se fraudulent
and void as to creditors ... If the result of the reservation is to defeat the
rights of creditor, the transaction is illegal regardless of the actual intention
of the parties thereto. In expanding on this concept courts have identified
"illusory transfers" - one which takes back all that it gives-and "colorable
transfers" -where the transfer appears absolute on its face but due to some
secret or tacit understanding between the transferee and transferor it is not
transferred because the parties intended ownership to be retained by the
transferor. See 3 7 AmJur 2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, §35
(emphasis added).
In Sun National Bank v. Visci, A-6045-09Tf, A-0317-1 Ot4 (NJSUP) (unpublished),
an attorney engaged in conduct very similar to the conduct in this case. During the course
of litigation, a business wired $419,000 into an attorney trust account. The attorney
subsequently paid out $417,000 to settle a lawsuit. The court held that "[ a ]!though the
[U FTA] does not define the term 'transferee,' we conclude it is self-evident that Frank,
Nancy and the Visci law firm are transferees because they are persons within the orbit of
the statutory definition of transfer: 'Transfer means every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset
or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a
lien or other encumbrance."'
Although this case is from another jurisdiction, this case is persuasive because the
14
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~

Utah legislature specifically directed courts to interpret the statute consistent with
interpretation from other states. U.C.A. §25-6-12 ("This chapter shall be applied and
construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this chapter among states enacting it.")
In Tel. Equip. Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd., 80 S.W. 3d 601 (Tex.
App. 2002), Texas used the term "transfer" as defined by its fraudulent transfer act to
VP

determine whether a person was a transferee. In Trigeant Holdings, Ltd. v. Jones, 183
S.W.3d 717, 726 (Tex. App. 2005) the court stated, "[u]nder this broad definition of
"transfer," the purchase by and transfer to the Trigeant Holdings entities of an equitable
interest in the Corpus Christi refinery-the very subject of Jones's causes of action-renders
the Trigeant Holdings entities "transferees" under the UFTA." Utah should follow Texas
and use the term "transfer" as defined in the UFT A to determine who is a transferee.

C.

Utah Should Not Adopt the Equitable Doctrines of Bankruptcy Courts
When Applying the UFT A

The trial court noted that some of the language in the UFT A was borrowed from

11 USC §550 and reasoned that bankruptcy cases interpreting bankruptcy law are
persuasive in interpreting the UFTA.
Admittedly, there is some similarity between §550 and U.C.A. §25-6-9. Both set

15
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up a scheme where transferees are treated differently. Bankruptcy code uses the term
"initial transferee" while the UFTA uses the term "First Transferee." Under both laws,
that transferee is not given a good faith exception. Subsequent transferees are given good
faith exceptions.
In Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.1988) a
Federal Appellate Court was concerned with who was a transferee and who was not.
Based solely upon public policy arguments, the court concluded that couriers and agents
are not transferees. It held that to be a transferee, a person must exercise dominion over
the asset. Over the years, this doctrine has grown in federal courts until it has become the
dominion and control test and requires that the transferee be free to use the asset to
purchase lottery tickets and invest in uranium stock.
'1fr;,i

None of the federal cases, as far as plaintiff's counsel has found, have considered a
statute that defines the term "transfer." In marked contrast to the UFTA, the bankruptcy
~

code does not define the term transfer.
Further, the federal courts have conceded that the "dominion and control" test is a
judicial creation and is not based upon statutory interpretation.

In re. Harwell, 628 F .3d 1312 ( 11th Cir. 2010) a law firm deposited settlement
funds into an IOLTA account. At the direction of the client, the law finn then disbursed
~
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the funds to numerous persons. When the client declared bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
trustee sought return of the money from the trust funds under the preferential transfer
statute in the bankruptcy code. The law firm defended arguing that it did not exercise
dominion or control over the funds. The court held that the "mere conduit or control test
vJ

is a judicial creation that is not based in statutory language, but is an exception based on
the bankruptcy courts' equitable powers." Id. Therefore, courts should apply a "a flexible,
pragmatic, equitable approach of looking beyond the particular transfer in question to the
circumstances of the transaction in its entirety.... The conduit or control test is based on,
and defined by, equity and requires good faith to escape 'initial transferee' liability. In
effect, we have tempered literal application of§ 550(a)(l ), examining all the facts and
circumstances surrounding a transaction to prevent recovery from a transferee innocent of
wrongdoing and deserving of protection." Id.
The court concluded that the law firm was an initial transferee as defined by
bankruptcy code and was therefore liable to repay the IOLTA funds to the bankruptcy
trustee. The court, however, remanded the case for findings on whether the law firm acted
in good faith. If it acted in good faith, it could obtain protection under the dominion or
control doctrine. If the firm did not act in good faith, it would have no protection and
would be forced to reimburse the judgment creditor for monies paid out to of the IOL TA

17
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account. The fact that the law firm knew of the judgment and used some of the monies to
pay its own fees was evidence that the law firm did not act in good faith.
This court should not adopt the conduit and control test. If it does, Utah Courts
will then be forced to go through the logical machinations of bankruptcy courts, such as
the Harwell court and apply tests that clearly contradict the code. If Utah Courts adopt the

Harwell logic, they will have to apply a good faith test to determine whether a person is
entitled to the good faith exception. Clearly, that is not consistent with the scheme of the
UFTA.
While some federal courts are clearly uncomfortable with the statutory scheme of
the bankruptcy code and have therefore developed a doctrine that allows them to
essentially ignore the statutory scheme, such is not a proper role for the courts and the
Utah Appellate Courts should not follow that path.
Utah Appellate Courts ought to interpret the statute through traditional rules of
statutory construction and determine that a transferee is a person to whom a transfer is
made.
D.

If Utah Does Adopt the Dominion and Control Test, Utah Should also
Adopt the Harwell Test

If Utah does adopt the "dominion and control" test from bankruptcy law, then Utah

18
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should adopt the reasoning of In re. Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2010) and find that
PADRM is a transferee.
Even if this court were to adopt the control and dominion test, PAD RM did not act
in good faith. It knew that the Keetches were debtors on a very large judgment. Brennan
Moss sat in the supplemental proceeding and heard the Keetches testify that they had no
assets, could not pay the judgment and were insolvent. With that knowledge, PADRM
accepted the $50,000 and paid it out to both itself and third parties ..

E.

PADRM Took Possession and Control of the $50,000, Did Not Act in
Good Faith and Is a Transferee.

When Tom and Teri Keetches money, held in Skyler's Mountain America Credit
Union (MACU) account, was transferred to the attorney IOL TA account, the debtors
parted with an interest in the money. When the money was in the MACU account, Teri
Keetch could withdraw the money merely by using an A TM card. While the money was
~

in the MACU account, Teri Keetch also had the ability to write checks to access the
money directly. She exercised that privilege on many occasions. Teri Keetch could also

vJ

access the money by asking her son to write checks or withdraw cash for her. She did so
on numerous occasions.
At the request of Teri Keetch, her 17 year old son, Skyler Crestani, wrote a check

v,p
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for $50,000 and gave it to Teri Keetch. The check was made payable to PAD RM. At that
point, the $50,000 had taken a circuitous route. It had originated as wages of Tom Keetch.
The wages were deposited into the MACU account, which was titled in the name of
Skyler Crestani and Carol Brown, but over which Teri Keetch exercised a great deal of
control. An instrument was then created, at the instruction of Teri Keetch, that had the
effect of removing the funds from the MACU account and back into the control of Tom
and Teri Keetch. At the request of Teri Keetch, the instrument was made payable directly
to PAD RM. Teri Keetch then took physical possession of the instrument and hand
delivered it to Brennan Moss, an agent of PAD RM.
When the money was transferred to the attorney IOLTA account, Tom and Teri
Keetch retained ultimate ownership but gave up some control of the money. Teri Keetch
could no longer use an ATM card to access the funds, nor could she write a check to
access the funds. Teri Keetch could not instruct her son to create checks so that she could
access the funds. After the deposit of the funds into the PAD RM trust account, Teri
Keetch was forced to gain the cooperation of an attorney at P ADRM to access the
$50,000. When the funds were transferred to the PADRM trust account, the Keetches had
given up an Hinterest" in the $50,000 in that they had lost a measure of control over the
funds.

20
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vi

In this case, possession and control of the $50,000 was transferred to PADRM.
Therefore, PADRM is a transferee.
II.

VIOLATION OF THE UTAH FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT MAY
SERVE AS A PREDICATE ACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR CIVIL
CONSPIRACY.
"Utah courts have continuously recognized the validity of civil conspiracy claims."

Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005 UT 85, ii 11, 128 P.3d 1146, 1149; Coro/es v. Sabey, 2003 UT
vJ

App 339, 79 P.3d 974; Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 1054;
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P.3d 332; Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, 2002 UT App
56, 42 P.3d 1253; DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996); Alta
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 n. 17 (Utah 1993); Israel Pagan Estate v.
Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
The elements of civil conspiracy are "(I) a combination of two or more persons,
(2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of

vJ

action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result
thereof." Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, il13, 275 P.3d 1024, 1029; Alta Indus.
Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 (Utah 1993); Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d
785, 790 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, in stating these elements, Utah Courts have not
always used the same language in describing these elements. For example, in Waddoups

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, if 35, 54 P.3d 1054, 1064 the court described the
elements of civil conspiracy as a "concert of action or other facts and circumstances from
which the natural inference arises that the unlawful, overt acts were committed in
furtherance of a common design, intention, or purpose of the alleged conspirators. 16
Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy§ 68 (1998)." Two cases have used the word "tort" rather than the
term "one or more unlawful, overt acts." Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362, 1 21,
199 P.3d 971,978; Coro/es v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,136, 79 P.3d 974,983.
The distinction between the word "tort" and the term "one or more unlawful, overt
acts" has not been developed by Utah Courts. In reality, these words do not describe

Cw

different predicate acts.
In this case, the defendants argued and the trial judge agreed that violation of a
Utah Statute providing a civil cause of action is not a tort and thus cannot support a claim
for civil conspiracy. Utah Appellate Courts, have held otherwise.
In Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, 116, 275 P.3d 1024, 1029 the plaintiff
alleged violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA). U .C.A. § 13-11-1.
The elements of a cause of action under that act are: ( 1) a supplier; (2) knowingly or
intentionally; (3) engaged in certain deceptive acts or practices; (4) in connection with a
consumer transaction. Martinez v. Best Buy Co., 2012 UT App 186,283 P.3d 521; U.C.A.
~
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§ 13-11-4. Thus, while a violation of the UCSPA is similar to the common law tort of
fraud, it has different elements. The plaintiff also alleged a civil conspiracy where the
unlawful predicate act was a violation of the UCSPA. In discussing that claim, the Court
held, "[t]he third underlying tort named above is violation of the UCSPA .... We
therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim insofar as it
is based on a violation of the UCSPA. To the extent Plaintiffs are able to maintain their
vj)

UCSP A claim, that claim is eligible to serve as a predicate act for their civil conspiracy
claim." Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82,116,275 P.3d 1024, 1029.
The Estrada case, and the others that use the word "tort" rather than the term
"unlawful act," use these terms interchangeably because when the word "tort" is viewed
in its broadest sense, these terms are interchangeable. A tort has been defined as "a civil
wrong for which a remedy may be obtained." Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, page
1497. Traditionally, contract claims are not considered tortious in nature.

0v

Violation of a statute is not a breach of contract. Instead, these statutes create a
"civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained." In a sense, these statutes creates a tort
remedy.
In determining whether an action sounds in tort or in contract, a court should ask
"whether that duty arises from a promise set forth in the contract or is one imposed by

~
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law, independent of contract." Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992).
In this case, the duty is imposed by law and in that sense, violation of the UFTA is a tort.
Even before adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the common law
recognized a tort that accomplished nearly the same objective. Although the common law
provided a remedy in these types of cases, the common law was not satisfactory. One
problem with the common law was that most states limited the cause of action to cases in
which the creditor had a lien or judgment against the debtor. Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S.
407 (1860). The fraudulent transfer act changed that. It modified the common law to
make the tort of fraudulent conveyance much easier to prove. Since then, many courts
have recognized that violation of the fraudulent conveyance statute is a tort. In a case in
which a civil conspiracy was alleged in relation to a violation of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated "such tortious conveyances may
definitely be the subject of a civil conspiracy." Dalton v. Meister, 239 N.W.2d 9, 18
(Wis. 1976); see also, Forum Ins. Co. v. Comaret, 62 Fed. Appx. 151 (9 th Cir. 2003) (a
debtor and those who conspire with him to conceal his assets for purpose of defrauding
creditors are guilty of committing a tort and each is liable in damages); In re Morse Tool,
108 B.R. 384,387 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (fraudulent conveyance action is not a suit in
contract); In re Penn Packing Co., 42 B.R. 402, 505 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (fraudulent
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conveyance act claim is tort for purposes of choosing statute of limitations).

v.P

Utah adopted a Fraudulent Conveyance statute prior to 1888. The Supreme Court
of the Territory of Utah recognized that the fraudulent conveyance statute was "merely
declaratory of the principles of the common law." U.S. v. Late Corporation of the Church

ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 18 P. 35 (Utah 1888).
Conspiring to violate the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is a sufficient predicate act
to support a claim of civil conspiracy. For that reason, the claim of civil conspiracy
should not have been dismissed.
vi)

CONCLUSION
This court should define the term transferee in the UFT A as a person who receives
an asset through a transfer. After adopting that definition, this court should overturn the
trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
This court should also hold that violation of the UFT A may serve a predicate act to

vJ

support a claim for civil conspiracy and then remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with that holding.
Dated this 10th day of June, 2010.

Nelson Abbott,
Attorney for Appellant, Paul and Janice
Timothy
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judici? ·ct

JUL 1I( 2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL TIMOTHY, et al.,

RULING AND ORDER

vi)

Plaintiff,
Case No. 120905780

vs.

PIA, ANDERSON, DORIUS, REYNARD
& MOSS, LLC, et al.,

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

Defendants.

Before the court are: {i) the motion for partial summary judgment filed by plaintiffs
Paul and Janice Timothy (the "Judgment Creditors"), and (ii) the motion for summary
vii

judgment filed by the Pia Anderson law firm (the "Law Firm.. ). The court has reviewed the
moving, opposition, reply, and supplemental memoranda filed by the parties, and heard

oral argument on June 27, 2014. The court ruled from the bench on all of the issues raised
vi)

by the pending motions, with the exception of the issue of whether the Law Firm is a
"transferee" within the meaning of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court

requested supplemental briefing on this legal question, and has now reviewed those
submissions.
vJ

The Law Firm's summary judgment motion turns on the meaning of "transferee" as
that term is used in the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-69{2)(a) & (b) (the "Act"). That section states:

Vi9

Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor
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may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted
under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim,
whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who
took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(2) (emphasis added). The parties' summary judgment motions
tum on whether the Law Firm meets the definition of "transferee" as used in the Act. If the
Law Firm is a "transferee" under the Act, then the Judgment Creditors are entitled to at
least partial summary judgment. If the Law Firm is not a "transferee''. then it cannot be
held liable under the Act and its motion for summary judgment on these claims must be
~

gran~d.
There are no decisions from Utah's appellate courts that explain the meaning of
"transferee" under the Act. And, like Utah's version of the Act, the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act does not define "transferee... The drafters comments to the Uniform Act give
little insight into what they intended "transferee" to mean. The only comment from the
Uniform Act about the "transferee" provision is:
Subsection (b) is derived from§ 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The value
of the asset transferred is limited to the value of the levyable interest of the
transferor, exclusive of any interest encumbered by a valid lien. See § 1(2)
supra.
Defenses, Liability, and Protection of Transferee., Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act§ 8, cmt 2.
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, on which this section is based, also does not define
"transferee".
Given the lack of an explicit definition, the term has been defined by the courts.
There are two general ways courts have interpreted the term. The first is to look to how
"transferee" has been interpreted by federal courts in the bankruptcy context - the position
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advanced by the Law Firm. This definition was explained by the Ninth Circuit as follows:
While the term transferee is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, it is
generally accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum. has
"dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one's
own purposes." Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d
890, 893 (7th Cir.1988). See also In re Video Depot, 127 F.3d at 1198
(same); In re Bullion Rase,ve of N. Am., 922 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.1991)
(same). In practical terms, the "dominion test'' requires that a transferee be
"free to Invest the whole [amount] in lottery tickets or uranium stocks."
Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 894. Dominion is therefore akin to legal
control (e.g., the right to invest the funds as one chooses), not mere
possession. See Bowers v. Atlanta Motor SpeedwayJ 99 F .3d 151, 156 (4th
Cir.1996) ("[T]he dominion and control test as set forth in Bonded requires
legal dominion and control over the funds transferred."); In re Coutee, 984
F.2d 138, 141 n. 4 (5th Cir.1993) ("Dominion or control means legal dominion
or control.").
In re Cohen, 300 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2002). Under this definition, unless the Law

Firm has dominion or control over the money in its client trust account, it could not be
liable for a fraudulent transfer.
Conversely, some state courts have adopted a broader definition - the position
urged by the Judgment Creditors. Those courts have interpreted "transferee" by looking at
the term "transfer", which Is defined In the Uniform Act. For example, in Texas, the Court of
Appeals of Texas affinned the district court's order granting a temporary injunction. Tel.
~

Equip. Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd., 80 S.W.3d 601, 611 (Tex. App. 2002).

There, appellant contended that it was not a "transferee" and therefore not subject to a
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act injunction. Id. The court disagreed and explained that:
UFTA defines "transfer'' to mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset
or an Interest In an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease.
and creation of a lien or other encumbrance." Id. § 24.002(12) (emphasis
added). A lien in [Appellantfs favor was created when, in complicity with
[company]. [Appellant] acquired the lien against [Appellant]'s property. Under
the facts presented here, [Appellant] became a transfereen when it became
a lienholder of [company]'s assets.
11
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Id.; see also Trigeant Holdings, Ltd. v. Jones, 183 S.W.3d 717, 726 (Tex. App. 2005}
(noting that "transfer" Is a broad definition and considering whether Appellants were

"transferees" as it relates to the definition of "transferJJ). Similarly, the Appellate Division of
the Superior Court of New Jersey explained that:

Although the [New Jersey Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act] does not define
the term "transferee." We conclude that it is self-evident that Frank, Nancy,
and the Visel law flnn are transferees because they are persons within the
orbit of the staMory definition of transfer. "'Transfer means every mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest In an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other
encumbrance.

Sun National Bank v. Visci, 060811 NJSUP, A-6045-09T4. Under this reading of the Act,
the Law Firm would meet the definition of a "transferee" because it received a "transfer" of

{\t.,

funds from or on behalf of the Judgment Debtors.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah has offered its interpretation
of the Act or, more accurately, its view of how the Act likely would be interpreted by Utah's
appellate courts. As Judge Kimball explained,
The parties rely on bankruptcy cases because the Bankruptcy Code was
the model for the provision of Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act that
distinguishes between initial and subsequent transferees. Under those
cases, an initial transferee is the first transferee who exercises "dominion
and control" over the money rather than someone who is a mere
"possessor" or "holder" of the money. Ogden v. Big Sky Motors, Ltd., 314
F.3d 1190, 1202 (10 th Cir.2002). Exercising "dominion and control" means
the transferee has sufficient control over the funds to "put the money to
one's own purposes." Malloy v. Citizens Bank, 33 F .3d 42 (10 th Cir.1994 ).
Wing v. Ha"ison, 2:03 CV 26DAK, 2004 WL 966298 (0. Utah Apr. 29, 2004).

Judge Waddoups reached the same conclusion, applying Texas law, in McConkie
v. Rice Properties, 2:09CV275, 2012 WL 2120066 (D. Utah June 11, 2012). Judge
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Waddoups explained that, "(a] person is not a transferee of money until one has "legal
dominion or control over the funds; that is, the right to put the money to one's own use."

McConkie v. Rice Properties, 2:09CV275, 2012 WL 2120066 (D. Utah June 11, 2012). The
Court continued: "[a]n agent or intermediary who receives money on behalf of another
party, and who does not have dominion or control over the use of the money, is therefore
not a transferee, but a mere conduit." Id.
Because the relevant provisions of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act were
modeled on federal Bankruptcy law, the court is persuaded that "transferee" as used in the
Act is most logically defined in the manner it has been defined In the Bankruptcy context.
That is, a 1ransferee" must exercise dominion or control over the transferred asset Here,
the law firm did not - and could not - exercise dominion or control over funds held in the
firm's trust account. The Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly prevent a law firm from
~

using those funds at their discretion. Accordingly, the Law Firm was not a ..transfereen
within the meaning of the Act and the Judgment Creditors' fraudulent conveyance clalms
fall as a matter of law. Those claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
There are two remaining claims, the Fourth Cause of Action for civil conspiracy, and
the Fifth Cause of Action for "participation in wrongful conduct'', asserted against one of
the partners in the Law Firm. The Law Firm argues that if the fraudulent conveyance
claims fail, then the remaining claims necessarily fail as well. The court disagrees. The civil
conspiracy claim alleges that the Law Firm did not simply receive a transfer of funds from
the judgment debtors, but that the Law Firm actively participated with them in a scheme to
secret funds away from the Judgment Creditors and conspired with them to facilitate the
judgment debtors use of those funds for other purposes. While the claim references a
violation of the fraudulent transfer act, the elements plaintiff would be required to prove to
prevail on this claim extend well beyond that. The purpose of the dominion and control test
is to protect innocent third parties who hold funds but do not have the ability to use them;

V/9

(sP

but if a judgment debtor could conspire with a third party to hide funds from a creditor, and
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then use the dominion and control test to avoid liability, the purpose of the test would be
subverted. Because the claim for civil conspiracy is not co-extensive with the fraudulent
conveyance claim, the failure of the latter claim does not necessarily mean the former
must fail as well. Neither party is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
As far as the Fifth Cause of Action, the court reads it to be a claim that Mr. Moss is
individually liable along with the Law Firm. Insofar as the Judgment Creditors seek to

~

impose individual liability based on a purported violation of the Act, that claim fails as a
matter of law for the reasons described above. However, to the extent this claim is based
on the civil conspiracy claim, there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude
summary judgment.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered as
~

follows:
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims for violation of the
Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the first through third claims for relief In the
amended complaint) is granted, plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on
these claims is denied, and these claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the fourth and fifth causes of action is
denied, plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on these claims is likewise
denied.
This Ruling and Order is the order of the court, and no additional order is required
to be prepared.
DATED this 14th day of July, 2014.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
VP

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL TIMOTHY, et al.,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 120905780

vs.
PIA, ANDERSON, DORIUS, REYNARD
& MOSS, LLC,

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

Defendants.

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants. The
motion was fully briefed and argued on December 11, 2014. Nelson Abbott appeared on
vJ

behalf of plaintiffs; Ryan Mitchell appeared on behalf of defendants. Following the
hearing the court took the matter under advisement.
In its Ruling and Order dated July 14, 2014, the court granted in part and denied
in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims for violation of the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act on the basis that the law firm and its partners are not
"transferees" within the meaning of the Act. Based on the arguments made at that time,
the court denied the motion for summary judgment on the only remaining claims in the
case, for civil conspiracy against the law firm and for "participation in wrongful conduct"
against Mr. Moss. Thereafter, and in response to the court's rulings regarding the

VP

applicability of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, defendants filed another
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motion for summary judgment that raised new legal arguments concerning the remaining
claims.
Although there are ostensibly two claims for relief remaining, plaintiffs' counsel
clarified at the hearing the nature of the claim for "participation in wrongful conduct".
Specifically, it is not (as defendants had argued) a claim for aiding and abetting and is
not really an independent cause of action. Rather, it is an effort by plaintiffs to obtain a

~

judgment against Mr. Moss individually, in addition to a judgment against the law firm.
According to plaintiffs, the only real claim that remains is for civil conspiracy; a claim for
which (according to plaintiffs) both the law firm and Mr. Moss should be liable. In short,
the only substantive claim remaining is the claim for civil conspiracy.
As noted above, the court has ruled that the law firm and Mr. Moss cannot be
liable for violating the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Plaintiffs have not asserted
a claim for common law fraud, or any other claim for relief that serves as the basis for
their civil conspiracy claim. Defendants' argue that even if the judgment debtors violated
the Act, that cannot as a matter of law serve as the basis for a civil conspiracy claim
against the law firm and its partners, who themselves are not liable for violation of the
Act as a matter of law. Plaintiffs maintain that the defendants can still be liable for
conspiring with the judgment debtors and materially assisting them in their violations of
the Act.
"The claim of civil conspiracy 'requires as one of its essential elements, an

~

underlying tort." Puttuck v Gendron, 2008 UT App 362 ,r21, quoting Coro/es v. Sabey,
2003 UT App 339 ,r36 (affirming dismissal of civil conspiracy claim where plaintiff had
not pied existence of an underlying tort); see a/so Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc.,
462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10 th Cir. 2006) ("Under Utah law, civil conspiracy requires, as one
of its essential elements, an underlying tort."). Although the question has not been
addressed by Utah's appellate courts, the majority view appears to be that state and
federal statutes governing "fraudulent" conveyances are not based on tort principles.
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Moreover, and perhaps more important, the majority view appears to be that tort
principles, such as civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, cannot be used to get
around the statutory limits of fraudulent conveyance actions; namely, those that limit the
reach of such statutes to "transferees". The court in GA TX Corp v. Addington, 879 F.
Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Ky 2012), examined at length various theories that have been
advanced to extend the reach of such statutes and collects the case law from around the
country that has rejected the various approaches. The court is persuaded that if
presented with the question, Utah's appellate courts would follow the reasoning of these
cases and not permit civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, or similar theories to extend
vJ

the reach of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. For this reason, the court
grants defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses with prejudice the
remaining claims in the case.

v:J

ORDER

For the reasons explained above and in the papers filed by defendants, and for
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' remaining claims in this case are
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial date in this matter is vacated along with
all other scheduling and pretrial matters.
vJ

This Ruling and Order will serve as the final order of the court and no additional
order or judgment is required to be prepared.
DATED this 24th day of December, 2014.
DISTRICT COURT JUDG
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